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What, if anything, can Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) contribute to the democratisation of 
public spheres outside of Westphalian frameworks? On the one hand TANs excel at turning 
international public campaigns into political influence, connecting people and power across borders. 
On the other hand, the increasingly policy-orientated nature of TANs raises questions about their 
legitimacy in speaking on behalf of multiple publics. This article suggests that a TANs success in 
ensuring the political efficacy of public spheres, whilst at the same time undermining their normative 
legitimacy, reflects two sides of the same coin; a consequence of the recent internal 
professionalization of advocacy networks. Framing professionalization as a particular form of 
communicative distortion within TAN decision-making, the article suggests that networks should 
incorporate internal deliberative mechanisms, adapted from international social forums, as a way to 
enhance the normative legitimacy of democratic public spheres.   
Key words: Transnational Advocacy Networks, Public Spheres, NGOisation, Deliberation, Social 
Forums 
Introduction 
Transnational civil society organisations have increased exponentially over the past few decades. A 
number of scholars have recently explored the possible role that these organisations can play in 
enhancing democratic spaces outside of the traditional Westphalian system (Bohman 2010; Dryzek 
2005: Eckersley 2007; Germain 2010; Nanz and Steffek 2004; Samhat and Payne 2003). As an 
intermediate structure between domestic civil society and international regimes, transnational civil 
society can contribute to the cultivation of transnational public spheres; “discursive arenas that 
overflow the bounds of both nations and states” (Fraser 2014a). In the absence of formal democratic 
institutions at the global level, these public spheres are said to represent alternative democratic 
spaces where civil society organisations can mobilise public opinion across borders whilst 
challenging political decisions at the international level (Bohman 2007: 65).  
What, if anything, can the emergence of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) contribute to the 
democratic institutionalisation of transnational public spheres? TANs have become an ever 
increasing presence in world politics, comprised of a complex web of NGOs that overlap with state 
agencies, international organisation staff and the media (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Florini 2000; Bob 
2002). Often sporadic and unevenly distributed, TANs are anchored by advocacy-orientated NGOs 
that share information and mutual support to generate collective action across national borders 
(Price 2003; Smith and Jenkins 2011; Stroup and Murdie 2012). TANs have been successful in 
connecting ‘people and power’ (Young 2001: 73); elevating and coordinating domestic struggles 
outside of national borders whilst pressurising states and international organisations to change their 
established patterns of behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1999; Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink 1999; Florini 2000).  
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On the one hand, TANs excel in connecting to political ‘power’ through a mixture of public 
campaigns, and private lobbying, to influence the establishment of new international legal 
frameworks. On the other hand, however, their differentiation from transnational social movements 
as professional networks with “more specialised resources of expertise” (Sperling, Ferree and 
Risman 2001), raises questions about their legitimacy in being able to speak on behalf of the 
‘people’. Nancy Fraser (2014a) argues that both conditions are requisites for TANs to effectively 
contribute to democratic public spheres; public opinion channelled through civil society must be 
normatively legitimate, that is, it is communicatively generated through an open and inclusive 
process, as well as politically efficacious; able to exert significant influence over political authority. 
This article argues that a TANs ability to implement the political efficacy, whilst diminishing the 
normative legitimacy, of public spheres, are two sides of the same coin; a consequence of a new 
socio-economic shift in the internal composition of TANs, towards increasingly professional 
organisations. This process of ‘NGOization’ (Alvarez 2009; Jad 2004; Lang 2009; 2012; Merz 2012), 
can increase the opportunities for policy influence, but at a cost of elevating strategic action within 
TAN decision-making. The consequence of which is a reduction in the inclusivity and participatory 
parity of decision-making in networks, generating ‘pseudo-publics’ (Junge 2012) disconnected from a 
communicative environment.   
Viewing the professionalization of NGOs through a critical-theoretical lens, the article suggests that 
scholars should seek to address the problems of strategic action and the distorting effects of 
powerful communicators that can stifle broader input within advocacy networks. Legitimate 
decision-making therefore requires the development of deliberative spaces to ensure that those 
marginalised within networks have the chance to influence, contest and validate campaign strategies 
across ‘an even playing-field’. As such, the article turns towards the innovative decision-making 
mechanisms utilised within international social forums as a possible model for TANs to improve the 
inclusivity, participatory parity, and thus the normative legitimacy, of public spheres.  
Whereas TANs suffer normative deficits but are politically efficacious, international social forums are 
the reverse; able to generate communicative power amongst diverse participants but lacking the 
ability to connect to political power. By combining various aspects of both, implementing the social 
forum process as a decision-making mechanism internal to TAN campaign strategies, a balance can 
be struck. As a consequence, TANs can support the production of both communicative and 
administrative power within democratic public spheres.   
Transnational Advocacy Networks and public spheres 
How do civil society organisations contribute to the democratisation of transnational public spheres? 
The origins of the public sphere can be traced back to late Renaissance Europe, with the rise of new 
spaces for citizens to collectively deliberate on public matters outside the realm of formal politics 
(Habermas 1991). At a conceptual level, it represents an “institutionalized arena of discursive 
interaction” (Fraser 1990: 57) where different viewpoints and opinions are expressed, resulting in 
streams of communication that are then synthesized into “bundles of topically specified public 
opinions” (Habermas 1996: 360). For critical theorists, the theory of a public sphere was not simply 
developed as a category for understanding new communication flows but as a critical-normative 
resource to interrogate the relationship between public opinion and political power. The democratic 
health of public spheres can therefore be judged on how they function as a public site of 
deliberation over common issues of concern, as well as how far they can act as a “vehicle for 
marshalling public opinion as a political force” (Fraser 2014: 9).  
3 
 
The social infrastructure of a public sphere is constituted by civil society, an “organisational 
substratum of the general public of citizens…who want to have an influence on institutionalized 
opinion- and will-formation” (Habermas 1996: 367). Civil society organisations often undertake a 
defensive and offensive role; protecting the opinion-formation of public opinion, whilst 
implementing its will-formation. Defensively they can preserve the critical nature of the 
communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld, through the generation of subcultural counter-
publics, as well as acting as a barrier to protect social identity formation from state and market 
intrusion. Offensively, civil society organisations can mobilise matters of public concern to shape 
political will and pressure policy-makers to remain publically accountable (Arato and Cohen 1994: 
519-32; Habermas 1996: 370).  
Although the public sphere was originally theorised as a discursive space within the nation-state, 
scholars have recently charted the possible emergence of a multitude of transnational public spheres 
that operate as intermediary structures between domestic civil society and international regimes 
(Bohman 2010; Eckersley 2007; Fraser 2014a; Germain 2010; Nanz and Steffek 2004; Samhat and 
Payne 2003). The transnationalisation of civil society organisations that have proliferated in recent 
decades reflects the emergence of post-Westphalian public spheres; however, their democratic 
potential depends upon their ability to generate communicative power across borders, whilst 
attaining meaningful influence over policy-making at the international and supranational level 
(Germain 2010).  
Can Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) support the normative requirements for the 
realisation of democratic public spheres? As networks comprised of a number of public advocacy1 
NGOs, they interact with citizens and grassroots organisations, as well as policy-makers in 
international organisations. In terms of enhancing the political efficacy of public opinion, civil society 
needs to be able to ‘translate’ (Fraser 2014a: 31) communicative power into new binding laws; thus 
political institutions must be ‘responsive’ (Steffek et al 2010: 110-112) to the demands of civil 
society. TANs have arguably been successful in this regard, shaping state behaviour through 
concerted public campaigns on a range of transnational issues leading to the establishment of new 
legal frameworks. This includes a number of successful cases in the areas of cluster munitions and 
landmines (Bolton and Nash 2010; Price 2003; Shawki 2011), the environment (Orsini 2013; Wallbott 
2014), human rights (Hertel 2006; Wong 2012), and gender (Moghadam 2005; Zippel 2004).  
Despite the important role that TANs can play in enhancing the political efficacy of public opinion 
they arguably fare less well in consolidating the normative legitimacy of public opinion. According to 
Fraser (2014a: 28) a normatively legitimate process of opinion-formation can only be satisfied when 
it meets both the condition of inclusiveness and the condition of participatory parity. The first is 
loosely underpinned by the Habermasian ‘all-affected principle’2 that those affected by political 
decisions should have the chance to participate in the process of opinion-formation (Näsström 
2011). The second recognises that mechanisms must be established to ensure that all participants 
have a chance to equally express and challenge the different views and opinions generated. In 
essence, satisfying participatory parity means “dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent 
some people from participating on a par with others” (Fraser 2013: 123) and enhancing the 
‘transparency’ of dialogue to facilitate fair deliberation (Steffek et al 2010: 112-115). These two 
idealised conditions therefore can be used as a gauge to help expose the presence of unjustified 
exclusions and disparities within the communicative generation of public opinion (Fraser 2014a, 
p28fn).  
In practice this means that when TANs are engaging with policy-makers, they need to ensure that 
the articulation of public grievance has been subject to an inclusive internal debate where all who 
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stand to be affected are given a stake in the decision-making process underpinning issue 
mobilisation. This is what Bohman (2010: 434) describes as a successful transition from 
communicative freedom to communicative power, when a TAN’s political success is underpinned by 
an open and inclusive debate amongst stake-holders. TANs, however, have a more controversial 
relationship when it comes to the representation and participation of grassroots organisations 
within their advocacy campaign structures. Indeed they have been roundly criticised across a 
number of quarters for their apparent elitism and unaccountability to diverse publics (Collingwood 
and Logister 2005; Hudson 2001; Ossewaarde et al 2008). These networks appear to be very 
effective at implementing policy, but often fail to assess their own internal democratic credentials.   
Interestingly it is the professionalization of NGOs that sits at the heart of the inverse correlation 
between a TANs ability to enhance the political efficacy, whilst undermining the normative 
legitimacy, of public spheres.  
Diluting normative legitimacy? The professionalization of Transnational Advocacy Networks  
Over the past two decades there has been “an explosion of international opportunities” (Reimann 
2006: 46) for NGOs to obtain funding and access to international networks and organisations. As a 
consequence, many have undergone a particular form of organizational reconfiguration that 
increasingly reflects the international climate within which they now operate. This process of 
‘NGOization’ (Alvarez 2009; Jad 2004; Lang 2009; 2012; Merz 2012) refers to social movements and 
grassroots organisations that “professionalize, institutionalize and bureaucratize in vertically 
structured, policy-outcome-orientated organizations” (Lang 2012: 63-4). This process is prevalent 
within TANs, comprised of member organisations that are often at the forefront of policy-
engagement. Professionalism in this context is the result of NGOs attempting to imitate professional 
political agencies, involving a self-conscious form of ‘impression management’ (Minkoff and Powell 
2006: 597) on behalf of NGOs who desire external legitimacy with policy-orientated audiences. In 
practice, this includes an organisational shift towards hierarchical bureaucratic structures with 
boards of directors and permanent staff members, as well as the creation of a professional cadre 
with technical and administrative expertise in project management (Alvarez 2009; Jad 2004; 
Nazneen and Sultan 2009). Crucially, this shift towards higher degrees of professionalism can affect 
the mission, goals and management of NGOs, as well as influence the trajectory of their advocacy 
strategies (Lang 2009: 62). 
One of the most noticeable features of TANs in recent years is how this organisational shift can 
actually enhance an NGO’s political opportunity structures, organisational strength and resource 
mobilisation; key for successful frame resonance with policy-makers. The ability for TANs to gain 
political salience over certain issues, and thus affect the political efficacy of public spheres can be 
linked to the ‘internal composition’ (Wong 2012) of NGOs. The more formalised, centralised and 
public-policy orientated an organisation, the more their highly skilled staff can “manipulate the 
political opportunity structure to their advantage by gaining institutional access, mobilizing support 
from influential allies, and exploiting changes in political alignments and conflicts” (Joachim 2003: 
269). A higher degree of NGO technical proficiency is linked to a rise in advocacy credibility in some 
circles; certain NGO staff can now “sit at government tables” (Lang 2012: 64) as well as offer expert 
commentary on directives, codes of practice and treaty drafts in formal institutional settings (Zeppel 
2004). Conversely, transnational campaigns can fail to gain political traction without the specific 
support of ‘advocacy elites in central hubs’ (Carpenter 2014: 149) of the network; the gatekeepers of 
advocacy success.  
Despite the role that professionalism can play in ultimately ‘opening doors’ (Pieck 2013: 8) for 
advocates and ensuring the translation of public campaigns into real political success, the 
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professionalization of organisations within TANs can undermine the normative legitimacy of public 
spheres. Although Keck and Sikkink (1998) assumed that advocacy networks shared internal 
common interests and values, scholars have recently highlighted the internal spaces of contestation 
and conflict that can affect agenda-setting and strategic framing across networks (Andrews 2013; 
Bob 2002; Carpenter 2007; Henry et al 2004; Wong 2012). The process of NGOization in particular, 
can “foster hierarchical organisational structures and the concentration of power among 
professionals” (Salgado 2010: 512) exacerbating the unequal relationship between elite professional 
hubs and those increasingly on the outer spokes of networks. Highly centralised agenda-setting 
within hubs can improve the coherence and effectiveness of advocacy, however, it can also have the 
effect of “disallowing dissent from a variety of perspectives” (Wong 2012: 74) within the network. 
Elite advocacy organisations can effectively ‘vet the advocacy agenda’ (Carpenter 2014: 150) to 
ensure that “things get taken off the agenda before it goes to a broader audience of decision-
makers” (Wong 2012: 76). In light of Fraser’s (2014a) co-requirement of the condition of inclusivity 
and participatory parity, these centralised and professional hubs can be deeply exclusive, 
contributing to a participation gap in the decision-making process underpinning issue selection and 
advocacy strategies within networks. Recent studies on Transnational Feminist Networks (TFN), for 
example, chart the rise of a centralised bureaucratic elite dominated by a hierarchical professional 
cadre that can marginalise or even exclude those seeking more radical advocacy strategies outside of 
formal channels (Bretherton 2003; Fernandes 2005; Hertel 2006; Jad 2004; Lang 2009; Mendoza 
2002; Pieck 2013). Local feminist groups can struggle to shape agenda-setting and are often at a 
disadvantage compared to professional NGOs who often prioritise issue selection based upon 
expected political success (Hertel 2006).  
The valourisation of professionalism also exacerbates the ‘uneven geography’ (Smith and Weist 
2005) across networks between the global North and the global South. The increasing 
internationalisation of Northern NGOs are all too frequently at the central nodes of an advocacy 
network; strategic direction and policy planning tends to be centralised around a small dominant 
cluster who act as gatekeepers to “determine which techniques of mobilisation will be considered 
legitimate and effective” (Pommerolle 2010: 265 see also Lake and Wong 2009; Hervé 2013). These 
dominant clusters are tightly interconnected through ‘inner-circle brokers’ that enhance grant 
capture from external sources as well as keeping a tighter control over decision-making surrounding 
project budgets (Hervé 2013: 406; Girgis 2007). Northern NGOs tend to take on the responsibility for 
drafting and producing policy documents and reports owing to their higher degree of technical 
proficiency; Southern NGOs are less likely to be included in strategic discussion and design (Hervé 
2013: 411).  
The increasing trend of professionalization within networks can also result in a depoliticised and 
conservative approach to advocacy, a shift from contentious to conventional politics, where radical 
organisations are forced to adapt and transform their behaviour in order to participate (Bretherton 
2003; Lang 2009; Baillie Smith and Jenkins 2011). Fernandes (2005) describes how some feminist 
networks have been forced to focus squarely on media outreach over network-building; as a 
consequence a new dominant cadre of ‘media-savvy professionals’ have emerged. Across networks 
the process of professionalization can include a transfer of skillsets and the “replacement of activists 
by communication professionals found in other policy areas” (Saurugger 2006: 271). Equally activists 
find themselves recently having to positively assert themselves as highly trained professionals in 
order to secure further grants (Fernandes 2005: 44) and adopt conservative and conformist 
strategies in-line with those that distribute financial resources (Stroup and Murdie 2012: 430). Critics 
suggest therefore, that the rise of professional organisations within feminist networks has led to the 
“bureaucratic reduction of a feminist equality agenda” (Lang 2009: 340). TANs arguably struggle to 
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meet the condition of participatory parity when actors are forced to change their identity and 
behaviour within networks; feminists activists for example have been vocally critical at the elevation 
of technical proficiency across networks for enforcing a level of “emotional self-control” (Bretherton 
2003: 104) within advocacy. Pieck (2013) found that tensions were exacerbated between activists 
that brought an ‘emotive charge’ to agenda setting and professional staff members who were more 
concerned to “satisfy their programmatic goals and their funders” (2013: 132).   
Legitimacy and authenticity: from strategic to communicative decision-making  
Whilst the professionalization of organisations within TANs can undermine the conditions of 
inclusivity and participatory parity, how does this particular transformative process impact on the 
generation of communicative power? At the heart of a democratic public sphere is the ability for civil 
society to channel communicative power into administrative power. The professionalization of NGOs 
can increase the use of strategic action in decision-making; diluting and marginalising 
communicative power. 
According to Payne (2001), in the majority of case-studies written on TANs, advocates often apply 
pressure and coercion to change state policy through a process of strategic framing (2001: 41). 
These frames do not naturally emerge from a pool of possible interpretations, they are subject to 
internal political wrangling and competition between framing agents. Persuasive frames can 
sometimes be the result of strategic manipulation, thus the selection process may simply reflect “the 
distorting material influence of an advocate” (Payne 2001: 46). Payne’s concerns of strategic 
manipulation within TAN decision-making originates from Habermas’ (1987; 1996) writings on a 
specific form strategic action orientated towards successful persuasion in dialogue. Speakers 
exercising strategic action within decision-making tend to deploy a more instrumental focus on 
bargaining and coordination, over cooperation and argumentation. As a result, strategic action often 
arises in processes of decision-making that are dominated by powerful self-interested actors (Baxter 
1987: Payne 2001; Risse 2000). Strategic action, can however, be contrasted with communicative 
action, a form of “normative and open-ended communication” (Cohen and Arato 1994: IX) that is 
strongly orientated towards “mutual understanding, intersubjectively shared norms and collective 
values” (Habermas 2001: 82). Habermas was of course equating strategic interests associated with 
technocrats and policy-makers in the political sphere; juxtaposing it with the ‘civil-social periphery’ 
(Habermas 1996: 381) where actors can easily raise validity claims on normative issues through open 
argumentation rather than strategic bargaining (Baxter 1987: 42-45). 
The development of a professional cadre of advocacy technocrats across TANs, however, raises 
important questions about this link between strategic and communicative action deployed in civil 
society opinion-formation. The process of NGOization can arguably contribute to the distortion of 
communicative power through the homogenising proliferation of an ‘expertenkultur’ (Power and 
Laughlin 1996: 446) within NGOs,  consolidating the central hubs of advocacy networks where “a few 
powerful actors dominate and possibly block participation by diverse actors” (Knappe and Lang 
2014: 15). Professional practitioners of course do care about social issues and social change within 
advocacy strategy, but they are increasingly “selective and strategic in attending to different issues” 
(Carpenter 2014: 151). According to Cohen and Arato (1994: 450), the increasing bureaucratisation 
of the structures of civil society can sometimes lead to individuals deploying strategic action in 
decision-making; NGOization can therefore exaggerate the ‘strategic dimensions’ (Lang 2009: 87) of 
advocacy. This is crucial to understanding how norms that arise from within and across TANs may 
not reflect the full spectrum of grievance claims and in fact espouse more insular, institutional and 
strategic interests.  
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The process of agenda-setting within advocacy networks can therefore be said to be legitimate, or 
authentic, when it reflects the outcome of a genuinely voluntary consensus amongst individuals who 
are given equal opportunity to “test the veracity of claims and claimants” (Payne 2001: 47) in a 
communicative framework among norm setting actors (Deitelhoff and Mueller 2005; Risse 2000; 
Wiener 2007). Professional actors within TANs are fundamentally important for the implementation 
of advocacy strategies; success requires different skillsets such as report writing requiring technical 
proficiency, and policy lobbying requiring media savviness (Wong 2012: 193). The underlying 
campaign decision-making must, however, be open to all who have a stake in the campaign, to 
influence, challenge and steer the direction of advocacy within a communicative environment. How 
can TANs minimalise strategic capture and enhance communicative decision-making within 
organisations and across networks? Lang (2012: 64) suggests that some NGOs have attempted to 
subvert NGOization by ‘highly visible’ public advocacy campaigns to maintain links with grassroots 
communities. Although publicity is key for representation, simply increasing participation and 
visibility doesn’t necessarily improve participatory parity; decision-making is still deeply structured 
with some agendas being ‘vetted’ by strategically-driven actors.  
To this end, mechanisms to increase democratic deliberation amongst participants engaged in 
decision-making can play an important role in reducing strategic communication in often deeply 
divided and contested environments (Dryzek 2006). Deliberation stresses the importance of 
collective decision-making including the participation of all who stand to be affected by a decision, 
where participants are persuaded by the ‘force of the better argument’ alone (Elster 1998: 8). It is an 
inclusive ideal, giving those usually marginalised in expressing moral dissatisfaction a chance to 
participate in the negotiation of a genuine moral consensus on matters of public interest. The 
attempt to embed deliberative mechanisms across networks complements calls for NGOs to 
consider more democratic values internally (Eikenberry 2009). Many activists tend to focus on 
promoting voice and issue within advocacy networks; methods of communication and internal 
democratic practices of decision-making in campaigns are not always at the forefront of strategic 
priorities (Levine and Nierras 2007: 8 see also Hendriks 2006; Rubenstein 2014). Despite this, della 
Porta and Rucht (2013a) have traced a number of successful cases of small-group deliberation within 
Global Justice Movements (GJMs) where they observed both the co-presence of soft power and 
symmetric relationships among speakers (della Porta and Ruchts 2013b: 224).  Although in their 
observations they also noted instances of asymmetrical power through bargaining, agitatory 
persuasion and pressure, activists increasingly challenged ‘unjustified and illegitimate forms of 
power’ (della Porta and Rucht 2013b: 223) within meetings. Various attempts to reduce distortions 
were implemented including installing moderators and ‘silent observers’, alternating speakers by 
gender, postponing or delegating divisive or intractable issues, limiting speaking time, and insisting 
on the value of reaching a consensus (della Porta and Rucht 2013b: 219-23). 
Although these deliberative mechanisms were found to increase communicative power within small 
group settings, how would this work in practice within transnational advocacy networks increasingly 
constituted of asymmetric decision-making structures? This is particularly challenging given that 
meso-mobilisation groups involving strategically powerful organisations within a network are more 
likely to be “conflict ridden and characterized by power-orientated communication” (della Porta and 
Rucht 2013b: 230). The article now turns to an examination of how deliberative mechanisms might 
be embedded within diverse transnational networks. It suggests that drawing upon the 
communicative infrastructure of international social forums as an integral mechanism for campaign 
decision-making can increase the condition of inclusivity and participatory parity.  
Communicative power, deliberation, and international social forums 
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The emergence and proliferation of international social forums in recent years offers a useful 
example of collective spaces where heterogeneous groups of activists and NGOs gather to debate 
public issues, whilst implementing innovative techniques to reduce power-orientated 
communication. The most famous of these, the World Social Forum (WSF) is unprecedented as a 
collective platform, incorporating activists from the local to the transnational within a highly 
participatory, horizontalist and autonomist organisational culture (Conway and Singh 2009: 70). 
Since its inception in 2001, the WSF has been a lightning rod for activists all over the world highly 
critical of current political and economic manifestations of globalization. Its overwhelming success as 
an innovative collective space has given credibility to the idea of a ‘social forum process’ that reflects 
a “laboratory for experimentation in new forms of political identity and practice” (Smith et al 2008: 
41). The forum’s innovative approach to dialogue includes self-organised workshops, panel 
discussions, plenary sessions and information tables as part of an ‘open space’ environment that has 
become “vital to the development of contemporary transnational activism” (Rucht 2012: 11).  In 
recent years new informal approaches to networking have also been adopted including hosting film 
festivals, music concerts and cultural performances to foster a relaxed and informal environment 
(Katz-Fishman and Scott 2008).      
Despite drawing upon the values of deliberation within its own charter of principles, the WSF itself is 
not necessarily a deliberative space; it lacks fixed rules for participatory parity or a centralised 
decision-making process. Indeed it excels as a communicative arena by its radically inclusive and 
decentralised nature but is “intentionally not structured to produce consensus” (Conway and Singh 
2009: 71). The WSF’s open space policy has been subject to fierce debate over the years with critics 
labelling it ‘unmanageable’ (Albert 2009: 364) due to its vast size and unstructured nature. This can 
hinder collective campaigns and renders the WSF far better at collective self-reflection than 
collective self-organisation (Ponniah 2007). These debates have played out in subsequent iterations 
of the WSF since 2001, including at numerous regional social forums that have emerged in recent 
years. Prior to the 2004 WSF in Mumbai, activists questioned the ability for the forum to challenge 
global practices without a stronger organisational composition (de Sousa Santos 2006: 72). The WSF 
has responded with working committees for policy guidelines and working groups with executive 
authority. Arguably, regional social forums such as the European Social Forum (ESF) have gone much 
further, developing a number of ‘thematic network’ meetings to facilitate coordination and 
campaign planning, supported by an overarching European Preparatory Assembly (Haug et al 2009). 
Equally, the United States Social Forum (USSF) created a ‘People’s Movement Assembly’ to 
specifically move beyond the open-space framework of the forum and facilitate campaign 
organisation (Katz-Fishman and Scott 2008). At the 2010 USSF these assemblies were integrated 
closely into the forum process itself, creating a participatory mechanism that resulted in “effective 
deliberation and decision making” (Juris and Smith 2012: 299). The USSF therefore facilitates 
stronger collective action with little trade-off in terms of radical inclusivity; the forum continues to 
be seen as unique for its “diversity and its inclusion of so many politically marginalised groups” (Juris 
and Smith 2012: 299).  
This recent evolution of the social forum process towards greater collective action now includes 
examples of advocacy networks establishing their own ‘thematic social forums’ to integrate with 
regional and world social forums. One such initiative proposed to the International Council (IC) 
meeting of the 2015 WSF, was for the establishment of an Internet Social Forum (ISF). Spearheaded 
by JustNetCoalition, a group of NGOs focused on promoting a ‘just and equitable internet’, the 
intent is to create a thematic social forum as an intrinsic process to the establishment of a 
transnational campaign. The forum aims to promote a ‘democratic space’ for activists to debate the 
best methods to challenge the increasing centralised and corporate control of international 
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communications. It therefore calls for an internet for the global commons; a decentralised 
architecture that serves public rather than private interest (ISF 2015). The network comprises a 
multitude of activists and NGOs that are seeking to mimic the open structures of the WSF in their 
search to develop a coherent strategy with the eventual aim of writing a ‘people’s manifesto for the 
internet’ (JustNetCoalition 2015). One of the lead proponents of the forum suggests that:   
“we do need a space which is civil society only, where we can radicalize ourselves, make agendas 
which are coming from public interest, which really look forward to the interest of the people and 
marginalized, and can do it in an unconstructed manner” (Singh 2015) 
Utilising social forums, such as the ISF, as a central point of decision-making for TAN campaign 
strategies maintains the centralisation of agenda-setting, whilst ensuring that the ‘laboratory for 
experimentation’ structure allows for dissent and disagreement to productively flourish. A forum 
process could allow individuals from both hubs and spokes of a network to engage in more 
communicative decision-making rather than the usual top-down Annual General Meetings (AGMs) 
where elite actors “announce and promote projects already in process rather than to brainstorm 
and debate possible future projects” (Junge 2012: 413).  
International social forums may well increase inclusivity and participatory parity, however, there is a 
caveat; they can be described as ‘counter-publics’ (Conway 2004) or ‘weak publics’ (Habermas 1996: 
307; Bohman 2007: 31-2) operating outside of the formal frameworks of governance.  Their relative 
isolation from policy channels and occasional antagonism towards policy-makers can result in a 
disconnection from political will-formation (Patomäki and Teivainen 2004: 150). The WSF was 
established as an ‘open space’ to specifically counter the closed-door politics of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF); even the ISF is being developed as a reaction to the WEF’s ‘NETmundial Initiative’ (ISF 
2015). As a result, although social forums can improve the normative legitimacy of public spheres, 
they are somewhat hampered in being able to translate this communicative power into 
administrative power. 
From weak to segmented publics: enhancing normative legitimacy and political efficacy  
How can TANs improve the normative legitimacy of public opinion without sacrificing its political 
efficacy? One mechanism would be for TANs to deploy a centralised agenda-setting process 
underpinned by the decision-making framework of social forums, whilst decentralising 
‘implementation power’ (Wong 2012) so that diverse actors and organisations can then carry out 
strategic action more effectively. This ensures that the more professional organisations within the 
network can still influence political will formation, whilst grassroots organisations can focus on 
raising publicity and connecting with local social movements.  Although this of course represents a 
normative ideal, there is an interesting recent example of an advocacy network that has put 
something similar into practice.  The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has 
hosted two international civil society forums as an inclusive mechanism to generate a more 
normatively legitimate public campaign strategy prior to engaging directly with international policy 
makers through formal political channels.  
ICAN was first established in 2007 as “a global campaign coalition working to mobilize people in all 
countries to inspire, persuade and pressure their governments to initiate and support negotiations 
for a treaty banning nuclear weapons” (ICAN 2016). Focusing on the specific humanitarian impact of 
nuclear weapons, ICAN was integral to pushing for an international conference on the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) as a mechanism to kick-start and transform stalling nuclear 
disarmament talks that have been going on throughout the last decade (Sauer 2015: 6). The network 
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gained significant traction with a number of sympathetic Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) and 
three key HINW conferences commenced in Oslo (2013), Narayit (2014) and Vienna (2014) 
culminating in the Austrian government announcing a ‘Humanitarian Pledge’ to fill the legal gap for 
the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.  
Crucially, ICAN took the decision to establish a two day ‘ICAN civil society forum’ prior to both the 
Oslo and Vienna conferences, with the participation of over 500 campaigners to help galvanise 
efforts to start negotiations for a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear weapons. Although the 
forum paid little attention to the internal democratic mechanisms underpinning agenda-setting, 
activists deployed a number of innovative formats echoing social forum procedures including open 
workshops, interactive panel discussions, rapid-fire ‘lightning speeches’, meet and greet sessions, a 
speakers corner and a marketplace for disseminating information (goodbyenuk.es 2014). The forum 
heard stories from the Hibakusha, Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb, as well as virtual media 
presentations from celebrities to policy-makers. Despite a few problems with the selection of 
delegates3, and the lack of a central decision-making mechanism at the forum, ICAN helped to 
stimulate broad discussion and strategy amongst a diverse group of activists and organisations about 
the upcoming international HINW conferences.  
Although the forums reflect ‘weak publics’ being isolated from policy-making and executive power, 
ICAN actively generated new strategies from the forums which was then channelled into the HINW 
conferences where they engaged substantially in dialogue alongside policy-makers. Policy makers 
highlighted throughout the HINW conferences the important role of civil society in providing new 
views, experiences and information on the Humanitarian Initiative (Gandenberger and Acheson 
2014: 6) The HINW conferences therefore reflected a form of what Eriksen (2005) calls a ‘segmented 
public’; the combination of civil society and policy-makers outside of formal and executive decision-
making structures. Both the forums and conferences have arguably influenced the growing 
momentum of the Humanitarian Initiative, to date there have been 127 state signatures to the 
Humanitarian Pledge.  Although there is a long road ahead for ICAN to be able to exert enough 
pressure to establish full legal and administrative reform in the form of a nuclear weapons 
convention, campaigners are hopeful of following in the footsteps of previous civil society influenced 
humanitarian disarmament conventions on landmines (1997) and cluster munitions (2008).  
ICAN’s utilisation of forums as a prelude to policy engagement certainly demonstrates how TANs can 
build weak publics to enhance communicative power prior to political will formation. Integrating a 
stronger decision-making social forum process for future campaigns could reap greater rewards and 
help TANs to improve the normative legitimacy of public opinion without sacrificing its political 
efficacy.   
Concluding thoughts 
Attempting to build inclusive and highly participatory networks that can also influence political 
change at the international level is a difficult task. The increasing shift towards professionalization 
within networks may well improve the political efficacy of public opinion; however, the cost is a 
reduction in being able to speak on behalf of multiple publics as communicative power can become 
blocked by strategic power in decision-making. Although this gap is growing as a consequence of 
TANs becoming more specialist and policy-focused, these networks should not be jettisoned in 
discussions of democratic public spheres as Fraser (2014b: 136-138) seems to imply. The task for 
scholars should be to search for mechanisms that can help improve TAN internal legitimacy by 
strengthening inclusivity and participatory parity, without sacrificing the ability to translate public 
campaigns into political success.  
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This article has demonstrated how NGOization can marginalise those spaces for broader decision-
making, and the ability for actors to raise genuine validity claims, over the agenda-setting process. It 
has also tentatively suggested that strategic action may be reduced if decision-making over 
campaign strategies can be built around a centralised and open deliberative process such as the 
experimental models established at a number of international social forums. This would ensure a 
more open form of centralisation in agenda-setting across the network, whilst decentralising the 
implementation process so that professional NGOs can still excel at policy translation. Utilising a 
social forum process to build communicative power within advocacy networks may also help to 
circumvent the problems of international social forums as weak publics when it comes to 
implementing democratic public spheres that demand the translation of communicative into 
administrative power.  Examples such as ICAN demonstrate that TANs can adopt more open and 
innovative practices of decision-making via forums, whilst retaining a significant degree of political 
influence within the international regimes. ICAN’s attempt to build both weak and segmented 
publics offers an opportunity to protect and enhance this crucial link between communicative and 
administrative power; essential to the democratisation of transnational public spheres.     
 
Notes 
1. The origins of the term advocacy is closely linked to publicity; defending the rights and interests of 
excluded groups in society, guarding against the abuse of public power, and using public interest 
pressure to change established rules (Brelaz and Alves 2011). 
2. Fraser prefers to use an ‘all-subjected’ principle in that “all those who are subject to a given 
governance structure have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it” (2013: 130).   
3. The ICAN steering committee was able to select participants for the Oslo forum, whilst the Austrian 
government, as hosts, selected those for the Vienna forum. The forums were also state funded, 
raising questions about the autonomy and replicability of this model.  
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